Why does the strength of class voting vary over time? Recent research has emphasized factors to do with the structure of political choice at the party level. This article examines different aspects of this choice, and investigates whether voters are more likely to respond to the social cues or policy cues that parties send voters. The results from the British context suggest that the former are more important than the latter. The central implication of this finding is that social representation matters, and that the social background of political representatives influences the ways in which voters relate to political parties.
Introduction
The extent to which social divisions within society are expressed politically is a long established topic of controversy. Whereas most of the controversies over description and measurement have been resolved, many of the controversies over explanation remain. Why is (was) class such a major influence on voting behaviour in Britain? Why has the impact of class on vote declined over time? And more generally, why does its impact vary? What factors condition the political salience of social divisions? Answers to these questions have tended to fall into one of two camps: those that privilege social structural factors and those that emphasize political choice factors. The former -which dominated the early literaturetended to view political divisions as simple reflections of social conditions. This view is neatly summed up by Lazarsfeld et al who famously wrote: "A person thinks, politically as he is socially." 2 According to this 'bottom-up' approach, changes that have occurred within the electorate over the last 50 years, such as rising living standards, the spread of affluence, social mobility, and the emergence of new issues have undermined the salience of traditional group identities and made voters more individualistic. 3 Accordingly, the salience of social divisions has declined over time, and this in turn has led to a decline in class voting, which -despite rising levels of inequality -apparently signifies 'the successful resolution by political systems of deep-seated conflicts of social interests'. 4 The problems with this account have been well documented. 5 Firstly, on a theoretical level it is somewhat deterministic, and does not pay sufficient attention to how voters respond to the actions of political parties, and how parties themselves mobilise and appeal to different sections of society. Secondly, on an empirical level, these sociological accounts, which emphasise gradual processes of social change and individualisation, fail to capture much real world variation, and are unable to account for instances where the level of class voting increases as well as decreases. And thirdly, on a methodological level, evidence used to support this account has tended to rely on crude measures of the classvote relationship, such as the Alford Index.
More recent accounts of class voting have emphasised the role that parties play in mobilising social divisions and the ways in which voters respond to these mobilisation strategies. 6 These studies have attempted to account for variation in the level of class voting over time with reference to supply side changes in the nature of the political choice that parties offer voters. This 'political choice' approach treats the political salience of class as a response to changes in the supply side of party policies. Accordingly, as Przeworski puts it, 'individual voting behaviour is an effect of the activities of political parties.' 7 And thus changes in the electoral significance of class thus reveal more about how parties have changed than about how voters have changed. This line of thought has most recently been summed up by Evans and Tilley who argue that parties influence social divisions by differentiating themselves in ways that are relevant to the choices of voters on relevant axes of competition or, conversely, minimizing their differences on these axes so that they are less relevant to party preference.
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According to this perspective voters do not behave blindly, but respond to the structure of the political choice between the parties with which they are faced. Previous research has tended to examine the structure of this choice in policy terms, most commonly understood in relation to parties' position on left-right issues. The rationale for this dates back to Lipset et al's early assertion that the working class tend to prefer redistributive policies, and so they vote for parties on the left, whereas the middle class try to resist these claims and so vote for parties on the right. 9 Accordingly if parties differ in their policy outlook on left-right issues we would expect the salience, or strength of the class cleavage to be stronger than if the parties stand for much the same policy outlook.
Recent empirical tests of this hypothesis have received support in a number of different contexts. Oskarson finds that class voting is higher in polarised political contests (with reference to the policy position of extremist parties) in Northern Europe and Scandinavia; 10 Elff finds evidence that social classes respond to the policy offering of political parties in six West European democracies; 11 and country level case studies have also found policy effects on class voting in Britain 12 and Italy. 13 Collectively these studies go some way to showing that class voting is not purely a sociological phenomenon, and that the level -or strength of class voting -varies at least partially in response to political choice factors to do with policy. But these studies also leave a number of questions unanswered. For example, in the British context the policy polarisation thesis helps to explain why New Labour's move to the right, and the ensuing process of policy convergence between Labour and the Conservatives led to a decline of class voting in the 1990s, but this approach does not shed light on why class voting was so strong in the 1960s and 1970s, when there was also little ideological difference between the two main parties. This suggests that there may be other factors at play which condition the relative strength of social cleavages.
In this paper I build on these insights and examine the structure of political choice from a more sociological perspective; providing a link between the early sociological Bendyna and Lake 1994; Cook 1994; Dolan 1998; Huddy 1994; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Tolleson Rinehart 1992. 18 Sigelman, Sigelman, Walkosz, and Nitz 1995; Tate 1993; Terkildsen 1993. 19 See Berscheid 1985; Byrne 1971; Byrne, Clore, and Worchel 1966; Newcomb 1956. 25 See Andersen et al.1998; Aron, Aron, Tudor, and Nelson 1991. 26 Liviatan et al 2008. the trait inference, rude, if a disruptive audience-member is from a different university (i.e., is socially distant) than if he is from the same university (i.e., is socially proximal).
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This body of work implies that people are more receptive to information from similar rather than dissimilar individuals. From this we might expect that if a politician is socially similar to a voter (that is from the same class background) then the voter will be more likely to ascribe positive attributes to what the politicians is saying, and be more likely to believe what they are saying and think they are sincere. To a working class voter, it may therefore be more credible when a politician from a strong working class background says that they will stand up for the underprivileged, than when a multi-millionaire member of the aristocracy says the same thing. Thus, if a party contains many working class MPs, working class voters may be more likely to think that the party in question represents and stands up for their interests. This suggests that the greater the proportion of MPs from working class backgrounds within a party, the more the electorate will perceive that party as representing the interests of the working class, and the more likely the working class will be to vote for the party in question. Thus the social background of MPs influences party image which in turn influences voting behaviour.
Hypotheses
To investigate these claims I test a number of hypotheses. Recent research has shown that the strength of the class-party association in the UK is associated with policy difference between the two major parties. 28 Firstly then I simply aim to replicate this finding using an independent data source, and examine whether there is a link between class voting and policy representation on left-right issues. As Evans and Tilley state, "Party polarization should increase the magnitude of the association between social position and party choice; party convergence should reduce it. When there is ideological convergence the strength of the signals from parties to voters is weakened and the motivation for choosing parties on interest/ideological grounds derived from class position is reduced, and vice versa." 
H1:
The strength of the class-party association is associated with the policy difference on left-right ideology of the two main parties.
The second hypothesis that I test refers to the extent to which class voting is related to social representation, and the cues that parties send voters by selecting MPs from different social backgrounds. When the parties are socially distinctive in terms of the class backgrounds of their MPs, the motivation for choosing parties on class grounds is increased, and vice versa. Thus class voting is shaped by variations in the social representation of the working class between the parties.
H2:
The strength of the class-party association is associated with the social difference on class background of MPs from the two main parties.
The third hypothesis examines the nature of the joint impact of policy and social representation on class voting. If there is a link between social and policy representation, then voters may only pay attention to policy signals insofar as they come from credible social sources. It may be that it is more important to have people 'like you' in parliament than it is to have people who claim to speak on your behalf. Indeed, given the potential association between social representation and policy representation at the party level, it may be that the apparent association between policy representation and class voting is driven by variations in social representation, in which case we would expect the impact of policy difference on class voting to be mediated by the impact of the social difference between the parties.
H3:
The relationship between class-voting and policy is weakened by controlling for the social background of MPs.
Data and Methods
To test these hypotheses I analyse a merged dataset, which combines information on 
Changing pattern of class voting in Britain
The first task is simply to examine the association between class and vote choice in Britain over time. Figure 1 displays the probability of voting Labour rather than Conservative for each social class since the 1960s. The pattern is now well known, and has been well documented elsewhere. 38 The impact of class on vote has declined over the last 50 years, as can be seen by the narrowing of the gap between the lines in During this period there were thus clear ideological differences between the two parties.
Since 1992, and in particular since 1994 when Tony Blair took over the leadership of the party there has been a process of policy convergence, with the Labour party moving towards the centre ground, and the Conservatives moving somewhat to the left. perspective, it does cast doubt on one of the key intervening variables that is thought to link social change and class dealignment, which is to do with how parties have responded to changes in the social structural composition of the electorate. 41 So, although the top-down 'political choice' approach makes some significant advances over previous, more sociological accounts of class voting, it also leaves a number of questions unanswered, and suggests that there is perhaps space for further research on the topic.
Changing party representation of working class MPs
The next task then is to consider social representation, and examine how the social representation of the working class within the two main parties has changed over time. opposed to a being a response to class voting. The core hypothesis in this paper is that differences in social representation between the parties have a causal impact on the way in which voters from different social backgrounds relate to the parties, and is thus associated with variations in the level of class voting over time. However, an alternative causal narrative might be that as society has become more middle class people have become less likely to vote for working class politicians, and so consequently fewer working class politicians get elected to office. In this case social representation cannot meaningfully be seen as a cause of class voting, since it is itself a product of class voting. I will return to this point later in the paper. However, there are a number of factors which indicate that such an interpretation is faulty, and that the changes we observe in the social composition of MPs and also socially less distinctive. Whereas the former has received a great deal of attention, both within the literature on class voting and more broadly; the latter has not. In the next part of the paper I redress this balance and investigate the extent to which the electorate responds to both social and policy cues.
Class voting and social and political representation
To test the hypotheses I link data on policy representation and social representation to Class is the occupational background of the voter, POLDIF is the policy difference between the two main parties; Class*POLDIF is a cross-level interaction between class and policy difference, SOCDIF is the social difference between the two main parties; and Class*SOCDIF is a cross-level interaction between class and social difference. Controls are also included for basic demographics. In order to model the extent to which social classes differ in their voting behaviour I do not control for any attitudinal variables that may be endogenous to class at the individual level or policy difference and social difference at the party level, such as leadership evaluations, the economy, or party identification. 44 Three different models are specified, which test the impact of 1) policy representation on class voting; 2) social representation on class voting; and 3) the joint impact of policy and social representation on class voting. The relevant parameter estimates from these models are reported in Table 1. 45 Table 1 here
To test H1, Model 1 tests the impact of policy representation on class voting. The policy difference term is highly significant and negative, which indicates that people tend to be less likely to vote Labour when there are large ideological differences between the two parties.
This is certainly consistent with the view that Labour's move to the centre ground made the party more electable. The coefficient for the working class term is positive and also highly significant, indicating that even when we control for the policy difference between the parties people from the working class are significantly more likely to vote Labour than people from the salariat. In order to examine the impact that policy representation has on the level class voting an interaction term is specified between policy difference and social 44 For example, social differences at the party level may influence how different classes evaluate party leaders, and so leadership evaluations may themselves be a consequence of social differences. 45 The results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls for housing tenure and education (but data is not available for all years so these variables are not included in main models).
To test H2, Model 2 tests the impact of social representation on class voting. We can see that the social difference term is significant and negative, indicating that people tend to be less likely to vote Labour when there are large social differences between the representation of working class MPs within the two main parties. This, too, is consistent with the view that the social transformation of the Labour party into a more middle class body of MPs has made the party more electable. More interesting from a theoretical perspective though is that the interaction term between social difference and class is highly The model therefore provides support for H2, and suggests that the effects of class on vote may depend on the social difference between the parties. Comparing the fit statistics between the two models we can see that the social representation model provides a better fit to the data than the policy representation model. This suggests that class voting may respond more to the social signals that parties send voters than the policy signals.
Model 3 examines this possibility more systematically by testing the policy representation and social representation hypotheses simultaneously. As in previous models the main effects of both the policy difference and social difference terms are significant and in the expected direction. However, this time the interaction term with class is only significant with respect to social representation, and the interaction between class and policy difference is not significant. The magnitude of the interaction term between policy difference and the working class declines from a significant b=0.007 in Model 1 to a non significant b=0.001 in Model 3. By contrast, the magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction term between social difference and working class is unchanged at b=0.023
between Models 2 and 3. These findings show that once we take social representation into account the strength of the class-vote association does not vary by policy representation.
Voters may pay attention to policy signals in so far as they are consistent with the social signals that parties send voters, but there do not appear to be any additional effects of policy representation on class voting beyond those which are transmitted via social representation. This suggests that social representation not only drives the class-vote relationship; but also drives the association between policy difference and class-voting.
As mentioned earlier, an obvious consideration is to what extent variations in social representation is actually a cause of class voting, as opposed to a being a response to class
voting. An alternative causal narrative could be that parties have become more middle class in response to the diminishing importance of class on vote. Thus, as the political salience of class has declined, left wing parties have become more middle class in a bid to appeal to more middle class voters. However, if there is evidence that class voting responds to parties' level of social representation from the previous electoral period, then this helps to rule out this possibility. On this point, there is strong evidence of temporal effects in the expected direction, and the class interactions with the lag variable of social representation (t-1) are highly significant (Table 2 , Model 4). These estimates signify a process in which voters are responding to parties' social differences rather than the other way round. These results stand up even if we restrict the sample to just the post 1974 period, 46 which is when Evans and Tilley argue voters became more responsive to policy cues (Model 5).
47 Table 2 here
We can get a clearer sense of the substantive impact of these findings by plotting the average marginal effects from the interaction between the lag of social difference and class. . 47 The results are also robust to the inclusion of a simple trend term to capture the secular decline thesis. The cross level interaction between the trend term and the working class is not significant (p=0.793) whereas the interaction between lagged social difference and the working class is still significant at the 10% level (p=0.076) and in the expected direction. differences that the model is unable to explain. Thus we cannot reduce class voting completely to the social difference between parties. However, class differences become much more pronounced as the level of social difference between the parties increases.
When The general model is specified as follows:
where VOTE is party support (1 = Labour; 0 = Conservative), 0  is the constant, Class is the occupational background of the voter, LABCLASS is the occupational background of the Labour candidate; and Class*LABCLASS is a cross-level interaction between voter's class and 48 The 2001 BRS is selected because it had the highest response rate and largest effective sample size when merged with the BES. The survey was mailed to 1,859 candidates from the main British political parties and in total 1085 politicians replied, representing a response rate of over 58 percent (for full details and the questionnaires see www.pippanorris.com). Although the response rate was (as usual) higher among parliamentary candidates than MPs, the study includes about one third of elected MPs, and it is broadly representative by party and MPs' occupational background (for full methodological details of this and previous surveys in the series see Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; and Norris and Lovenduski, 1995) .
Labour candidate's class. Controls are also included for age, sex, education, and religion at the individual level, and economic deprivation at the constituency level. Three different models are specified, which examine the impact of candidate's class on class voting 1) across all seats; 2) across seats where the Labour candidate is a challenger; and 3) across seats where the Labour candidate is the incumbent.
Table 3 here
The relevant parameter estimates from these models are reported in Table 3 . Across all three models we can see that the sign for the class coefficient of the Labour candidate is negative, indicating that people are less likely to vote Labour when the candidate is working class, controlling for the level of economic deprivation in the constituency. This is particularly evident when the Labour candidate is also the sitting MP (Model 3), which is consistent with the findings from the earlier models presented above.
Across all three models we can also see that the interaction term between voter's social class and candidate's social class is in the expected direction. Given the relatively small sample sizes we have to be a little cautious in our interpretation of the results, but nonetheless the evidence is broadly supportive of the idea that working class voters tend to be relatively more likely than the middle class to vote Labour when the Labour candidate is also working class. 49 Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient for this interaction term is over four times larger when the Labour candidate is the sitting MP than when he or she is a challenger. This suggests that it is the class background of MPs rather than candidates per se that matters most. Thus, in addition to shedding light on the over-time dynamics in the strength of class voting, the social representation thesis also appears to shed light on variation in the strength of class voting across constituencies. Moreover, there is also evidence to show that way the party looks matters to voters, and that the class background of the Labour candidate influences the party's image. 50 From Table 4 we can see from the cross-level interaction that working class voters are more likely to regard Labour as being left wing when they have a working class MP in their constituency. Based on the average marginal effects, the model predicts that among the salariat 38% think Labour is a left wing party when the incumbent is middle class compared to 33% when the incumbent is working class, and that among the working class just 16% think Labour is a left wing party when the sitting MP is middle class compared to 42% when the sitting MP is middle class. Thus, working class voters are more likely to think that the Labour party is left-wing and stands for traditional working class policy interests when their local MP is from a working class rather than middle class background.
51 As far as the working class are concerned then, there is indeed the perception that a link exists between descriptive and substantive representation.
Conclusion
Recent research on class voting has emphasised the ways in which parties shape social divisions. The 'old orthodoxy' that the influence of class on vote has declined because social change has weakened the distinctiveness of social classes has been has been firmly rejected, 52 and the new wave of political choice literature instead relates dynamics in class voting over time to variations in the policy platforms of parties. 53 In short, without party strategy that emphasizes class differences in interests, class position is less likely to be strongly associated with party choice.
In this contribution I have sought to build on many of the insights from this emerging literature and in doing so to broaden the discussion of political choice to consider other ways in which parties may represent (or be seen to represent) the interests of different social groups. By focussing on the distinction between policy representation and social representation I find much stronger evidence for social representation effects on class underpins the idea of social cleavages. If class voting were based solely -or even mainlyon policy, then the phenomenon could perhaps more accurately be described as issue voting rather than cleavage voting. Whereas policy representation implies an individualistic and instrumental calculus (which may be aggregated to the group level) social representation implies a more group orientated and expressive calculus, which explicitly engages with social identity theory and social distance theory. Voters may think that people from their own social group will be more likely to represent their interests, but there is potentially also an expressive dimension to this calculus, and just the presence of people from one's own social group in a position of political power might make voters feel closer to the party in question, and better represented by it. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence from the social psychology literature to suggest that such mechanisms might exist, which could be explored further.
Focussing on issues of social representation then not only makes an empirical contribution to the study of class voting and the politicisation of social divisions more generally, but also provides a clear link to the theory of social cleavages, which emphasizes the importance of group membership. In doing so this approach also provides a coherent narrative of class voting in Britain over time, and we can draw a link between social change, party strategy, and voting behaviour. One implication of this research is that the social composition of parliament matters. It influences how people participate in the political process, and, potentially, it might also influence how people view politics and engage in politics more widely. This suggests that there may be empirical as well as normative implications to the on-going debate about the social representativeness of political representatives. Recent concerns about the extent to which MPs are socially representative of the wider population, both in terms of class, age, sex, region and ethnicity may have serious implications for how people from different backgrounds relate to politics. 
Figure 5
Predicted difference between voting Labour for working class people compared to middle class people by level of social difference between the parties Notes: These are predicted probabilities from Model 4 of Table 2 , and refer to the difference in percentage points between working class and middle class people voting Labour. Broadly speaking the results from Table 5 broadly confirm the pattern of associations reported in Table 3 . Given the sample size and missing data we should be somewhat cautious in our interpretation the results, but nonetheless the findings are reassuring in the sense that they are broadly consistent with the earlier analysis. The sign for the class coefficient of the Labour candidate is negative, suggesting that people are less likely to vote Labour when the candidate is working class, controlling for the level of economic deprivation in the constituency. The interaction term between voter's social class and candidate's social class is also in the expected direction. This indicates that working class voters tend to be relatively more likely than the middle class to vote Labour when the Labour candidate is also working class.
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